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Foreword
This is the second in a new series of papers published by the Centre for Independent Studies on issues of health and ageing. One of the main reasons CIS has launched this series is that health costs are set to spiral in the next few decades, but politicians show 
little sign of responding seriously to the problems this is going to cause. In this paper, Jeremy 
Sammut explains why the current system of providing health care in Australia is not going to 
cope unless it is substantially reformed. 
To its credit, the federal Treasury produced an Intergenerational Report in 2002, which it 
updated in 2007. These two reports try to estimate the level of government receipts, and the 
demands on government spending, as the population ages over the next forty years. The 2002 
report was a wake-up call, particularly as regards spending on the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme and other aspects of health care, but the follow-up was less alarming. Basically, the 
message from the federal government is that health spending is going to rise significantly, both 
as a result of ageing and of the rising cost of new medical technologies, but that Australia is much 
better placed to cope than many other OECD countries. Provided private health insurance 
holds up, taxpayers of the future should be able to pay for most of what the government needs 
to spend.
Sammut shows in this paper that some of the government’s critics think even this fairly 
optimistic message is too alarmist. The critics maintain that the economy will continue to grow 
and that this will take care of the rising level of demand and expectation for health treatment 
as the population ages. Against this, however, Sammut cites Productivity Commission research 
indicating that the Treasury’s analysis may be under-estimating the problem. This is because 
new medical technologies will combine with ageing to push total costs higher than the 
Intergenerational Reports predict. 
If the Productivity Commission has this right, we are facing a real problem, and the 
government and its critics are both being too complacent. Economic growth is not going to 
generate the revenue we need to provide the health care our children will expect, and the next 
generation of taxpayers is going to get a nasty shock unless something is done now to change 
the way health care gets funded.
Forecasting forty years into the future is an inexact science, but Sammut’s painstaking analysis 
in this paper suggests we would be wise to set more store by the Productivity Commission’s 
analysis than to rely on the Intergenerational reports’ more optimistic forecasts. The technology 
of health care is going to be revolutionised in the next forty years, and many of the ailments that 
plague the elderly today will be treatable in the future. People will live longer and the elderly 
will demand more than they have done in the past. The only way to meet these expectations is 
to get more of us today to set money aside for our likely needs in the future. 
Sammut points out that our current health care system – the public hospitals providing 
treatment free at the point of demand, our subsidised PBS system and our Medicare-based 
funding of primary health care – is based on demographic and technological assumptions that 
are now unraveling. This twentieth century system was not designed for twenty-first century 
conditions. Either we start to look at serious reform now, or we shall encounter growing queues, 
shortages and breakdowns of delivery in the decades ahead.
Peter Saunders
Social Research Director
The Centre for Independent Studies
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The Coming Crisis of Medicare
Executive Summary
•  The Federal government’s Intergenerational Reports (IGRs) show that as the Australian 
population ages over the next 40 years, demographic change will render current government 
policies fiscally unsustainable, mainly due to the rising cost of health care.
•  The IGRs have been criticised by academics and commentators who dismiss a looming 
health and ageing ‘crisis’ as a myth. Because the Reports predict that ageing alone will be 
responsible for ‘only’ one quarter of the projected increase in government health expenditure, 
the critics say that the impact of ageing on government budgets will be ‘manageable’.
•  Both the IGRs and the critics understate the significance of ageing. Work by the Productivity 
Commission estimates that providing health care to the larger elderly population of 
tomorrow will increase government health expenditure as a proportion of GDP per capita 
by one half.
•  The Intergenerational Reports also underestimate the scale of the coming crisis Medicare 
faces. The medical revolution will expand the range of high-tech and high-cost medicine 
available. The increased supply of therapies and procedures—which will particularly deliver 
new treatments for chronic diseases linked to old age—is set to increase demand for health 
care in older age groups far more than anticipated by the IGRs. Ageing will compound the 
impact of new technology and amplify the cost pressures on Medicare.
•  Neither economic growth nor ‘moderate’ tax rises can be relied upon to solve the health and 
ageing challenges of the future.
• ‘ Free and universal’, pay-as-you-go, taxpayer-funded health systems are a twentieth-century 
social policy designed to provide relatively cheap and basic healthcare to much younger 
and healthier populations. The demographic and medical realities of the twenty-first 
century imply that Medicare will not provide every citizen with ‘free’ access to all the new 
medicine.
•  This suggests that Australians need to think seriously about Medicare reform and explore 
new ideas about how to self-fund their healthcare in the future.
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Population ageing and why Medicare should be reformed
Over the last eleven years, the instinct of the Howard government has been to pursue health 
reforms which shift the balance in our ‘mixed’ health system from public to private financing. 
The private health insurance reforms of the late 1990s—the introduction of a 30 per cent private 
health-insurance premium rebate, and the new ‘Lifetime Cover’ community-rating system—have 
increased the percentage of the population with private health insurance coverage from a historic 
low of thirty per cent to over forty.
The most notable ‘reform’ of the Howard era, however, is the ‘Medicare Plus’ package of 
2004. It introduced the Extended Medicare Safety Net, which commits the Federal government 
to pay 80 cents in every dollar of out-of-pocket, out-of-hospital medical expenses incurred by all 
individuals and families in excess of $1000 annually. In a step away from the reform agenda which 
has dominated the public policy debate in Australia for almost a generation, Medicare Plus has 
reinforced the principle that government should be responsible for financing the healthcare of 
the Australian community. A new entitlement has been added to the Medicare system at a time 
when many Western countries are reassessing their commitment to ‘free and universal’ medicine. 
The cost pressures associated with the ageing of their populations are expected to render this kind 
of health system unsustainable by the middle of this century. Yet the Howard government has 
preferred (as the slogan goes) to be ‘the best friend Medicare has ever had’.
The significantly higher life expectancies and the significantly lower fertility rates of the last 30 
years mean that the population of Australia is ageing, and will continue to age at an accelerating 
rate as the baby-boomer demographic ‘bulge’ reaches retirement age. By the mid 2020s, there will 
be 2 million more people aged over 65; by the 2040s, the elderly proportion of the population will 
have doubled from 12 to around 25 per cent.
Demographic change will begin to have an impact in the near future. In 2012, the ‘boomers’ 
born at the peak of the post-war baby boom in 1947 turn 65—the age when health problems and 
demand for healthcare increases.
The 2007 Intergenerational Report2 (IGR2) predicts that over the next 40 years, population 
ageing will decrease labor force participation, halve the ‘aged dependency ratio’ (or the ratio of 
traditional working-age people to people aged over 65) to under 2.5, slow economic growth per 
person, and significantly increase government expenditure beyond anticipated growth in national 
income. As the baby boomers grow grey, the most important source of ‘fiscal pressure’—of 
expenditure outstripping revenue—will be federal spending in the ageing-sensitive area of health.
The projected doubling in federal health spending from 3.8 per cent of GDP in 2006–07 to 
7.3 per cent forty years later—due to the combined impact of ageing, new medical technology, 
and rising overall demand—is expected to contribute 3.5 percentage points of the 4.75 per 
cent rise in total Federal government spending. Health will contribute the most by far to the 
anticipated ‘fiscal gap’—the 3.5 per cent of GDP by which Federal government spending will 
exceed revenue in the absence of policy adjustments. In other words, based on current trends, the 
current policies of the Federal government, especially Medicare, are fiscally unsustainable in the long 
term. In 2021, in the absence of policy changes, the Commonwealth budget will go into deficit, 
and net Commonwealth debt will re-emerge in the mid-2030s and rise rapidly to around 30 per 
cent of GDP by 2046–47.3
As the baby boomers retire, stop paying tax and start to draw heavily on government services, 
the proportionally smaller number of taxpayers of tomorrow face having to pay considerably 
higher taxes to fund the healthcare of the Australian community. The Minister in the Howard 
Government who has been the most vocal about the unfair intergenerational implications of the 
looming ‘ageing crisis’, and the need to ensure that ‘future generations of taxpayers do not face an 
unmanageable bill for government services provided to the current generations’, is the Treasurer.4
Peter Costello has acknowledged that the ‘long-term structural challenge for Australia’ is to 
ensure that the health system is sustainable into the twenty-first century.5 Yet, arguably, not even 
the Treasurer has completely acknowledged just how unmanageable the ageing bill in health is likely 
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to be. Given the limits to future tax receipts, moreover, and the potentially limitless demand for 
sophisticated and expensive medical treatments, the unprecedented ageing phenomenon is not 
the sole concern. The additional concern is the impact of the medical revolution that is under way, 
and the effect new high-tech and high-cost medical technology will have on healthcare supply 
and demand, in combination with ageing. The new medicines and procedures in development 
to treat diseases and conditions associated with old age have the 
potential to increase health expenditure far more than anticipated by 
the IGRs. The threat this poses to the future of Medicare should not 
be underestimated.
The tendency in policy circles and among commentators and 
academics, however, is to underestimate the significance of ageing and 
the future pressure that this will place on Medicare. Ironically, Peter 
Costello’s Intergenerational Reports have played an important role in 
encouraging this complacent attitude, because both reports overlook 
how important is the interaction between ageing and the medical 
revolution. Instead, they have indicated that ageing is not the main 
driver of health expenditure growth and have understated ageing’s potential impact on health 
spending. The misleading impression that the IGRs have encouraged is that ageing, per se, is not 
a long-term health and intergenerational problem necessitating urgent health policy reform.
Does ageing increase health costs? The view of the IGRs
‘Health expenditure is projected to nearly double as a proportion of GDP over the 
next 40 years. This is partially due to the ageing of the population, although non-
demographic factor have an even greater effect’. —Intergenerational Report Overview 
2007, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2007), 12.
‘The major source of budgetary pressure is health care costs, which are projected to 
rise by about 4.5 percentage points of GDP by 2044–45, with ageing accounting 
for nearly one-half of this’. —Productivity Commission, Economic Implications 
of an Ageing Australia, Research Report, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 
2005), xii.
IGR2, released in April this year, states that ‘roughly two-thirds of the projected increase 
in real spending per person is driven by factors other than ageing’. This, it continues, ‘is most 
notable for health spending, where a significant component of the projected increase is driven by 
non-demographic factors such as the development of new drugs’.6 IGR2 repeats the conclusions 
also drawn in IGR1:
Non-demographic growth rather than population growth or changes in the age 
structure of the population has been the key driver of real health spending over 
the past two decades … Non-demographic factors (such as the listing of new 
medications on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and greater use of diagnostic 
procedures) are likely to continue to generate the greatest cost pressure in the future 
… with ageing contributing only around one quarter of the projected increase in 
health spending over the next 40 years. Factors other than ageing account for the 
remaining three-quarters of the projected increase in health spending.7
In presenting its findings, the Report separates out the ‘pure effect’ of ‘ageing alone’ on health 
expenditure.8 The Report’s conclusion that ageing will ‘have a much smaller effect on spending 
than the growing cost of new healthcare technology’9 depends on the assumption that demand 
for healthcare in the elderly cohort of the population, and thus future ageing-driven health 
spending, will grow in line with the historic trend. Crucially, this approach10 to assessing the 
impact of ageing is valid only ‘to the extent that today’s costs are a good guide to those that will 
apply over the long term (in real terms)’.11 Because it does not ‘predict the relative cost changes 
brought about by changes in medical technology’,12 this approach is prone to understating the 
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relationship between ageing and rising health expenditure.13 The ‘real issue is not what effect 
ageing will have on its own, but what effects ageing and the other strong drivers…will have in 
combination’.14
This is the problem with the Intergenerational Reports: they do not acknowledge the possibility 
that, or canvass the reasons why, ageing, in interaction with new technology, will lead to much 
higher than anticipated health spending.
Denial
‘Contrary to the popular belief that ageing is the primary threat to the health budget 
over time, population ageing is but one, comparatively small, factor in rising health 
expenditure’. —Pamela Kinnear, Population Ageing: Crisis or Transition, Discussion 
Paper Number 45 (Canberra: Australia Institute, 2001), 19.
‘Although it considered ageing to be an important factor, the Treasurer’s 
Intergenerational Report concluded that other factors constitute the main drivers’. 
—Judith Healy, The Benefits of an Ageing Population, Discussion Paper Number 63, 
(Canberra: Australia Institute, 2004), 29.
‘The Treasurer’s next piece of disinformation is his implication the projected hole in 
his budget—the fiscal gap—is largely the product of ageing: cost of the age pension, 
aged care and so forth. Not true. Read the report and you find that the greatest single 
factor by far in the expected growth is federal spending on health. And three-quarters 
of the projected growth in health spending is ‘non-demographic’, such as expensive 
advances in medical technology. Turns out that ‘roughly two-thirds of the projected 
increase in real [government] spending per person is driven by factors other than 
ageing’. Oh.’ —Ross Gittins, ‘Report and the Spin – now read on’, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 4 April, 2007.
Academics and commentators who deny that ageing will be responsible for ‘skyrocketing’ health 
expenditure, have been convinced by the IGRs that ageing is not the ‘most important’ problem.15 
How can it be said that the health costs of the elderly will inevitably drive up expenditure to 
unsustainable levels, place enormous pressure on governments, and 
unfairly overburden taxpayers, when the IGRs state that ageing is 
‘only’ going to increase health expenditure by one quarter?
Seizing on this, the harshest critics have repeatedly zeroed in on the 
Reports’ finding that the effect of population ageing per se on health 
expenditure is relatively small. Based on this finding, critics, who 
suspect the ‘ideological’ motives behind the IGRs’ intergenerational 
rhetoric, have dismissed the reports’ very premise, on the ground that 
the alleged ageing problem is actually ‘small and manageable’.16
The IGRs have become the centrepiece of the counter-argument 
employed to challenge the idea that Australia faces an ‘ageing crisis’. 
Perversely, therefore, the reports have helped to deflect attention away 
from the key issue—the long-term unsustainability of Medicare.17 For 
example, in response to the release of IGR2 in April this year, Ross 
Gittins, in his column in the Sydney Morning Herald, dismissed what 
he saw as the Treasurer’s exaggerations about the intergenerational impact of ageing. Crucially, 
the evidence Gittins cited in support of his analysis was the fine print in the government’s own 
Intergenerational Report showing that ‘three-quarters of the projected growth in health spending is 
‘non-demographic’, such as expensive advances in medical technology’.18
Perhaps this would not matter if the IGR analysis fully examined the health implications of 
ageing. But there are strong grounds for suggesting it does not. In two reports published in 2005, 
the Productivity Commission raised serious questions about the approach to health and ageing 
that IGR2 perpetuates.
The IGRs hae become the 
centrepiece of the counter-
argument employed to 
challenge the idea that 
Australia faces an ‘ageing 
crisis’. Perersely, therefore, 
the reports hae helped to 
deflect attention away from 
the key issue—the long-term 
unsustainability of Medicare.
4Jeremy Sammut
The view of the Productivity Commission
In 2004, at the request of the Council of Australian Governments, the Productivity Commission 
began research into the economic implications of the ageing of the population over the next 40 
years. The Commission’s report, Economic Implications of an Ageing Australia, broadly agreed with 
the prediction in IGR1 that the proportion of GDP spent by the Federal government on health 
would double over the next 40 years. Its economic modeling also confirmed 
that the change in the age structure—the additional numbers of elderly 
people as their proportion of the population doubles to 25 per cent—would 
mean that the effect of ageing alone would increase real government health 
spending by 25 per cent. But the Productivity Commission found that 
ageing was likely to have a much bigger impact on health spending than 
the IGR had suggested.
The Commission made two points. It took issue with the (falsely) 
reassuring way IGR1 presented the ‘smaller effect’ of ageing, and found 
that ageing cannot be underestimated as a source of health-related fiscal 
pressure, because of the impact that ageing also has on economic growth. The 
Commission also conducted a rigorous review of the local and international 
research and took issue with the claim that ageing will continue to be only 
a minor factor in rising health expenditure. The prudential warning issued 
to policy-makers was that it is reasonable to assume that the interaction between ageing and 
technology is likely to lead to considerable increases in health care demand in the elderly cohort, 
and hence to substantially ‘bigger pressures on the health system than … projected’.19
The ageing effect
The Commission found that:
‘In 2002–03, one third of total government expenditure was accounted for by 
services to the over 65 group. By 2044–45, this proportion is projected to increase 
to 57 per cent.
‘Another measure of the impact of ageing is the difference in projected expenditure 
with and without ageing. In this case, the without-ageing scenario assumes that 
population growth and non-demographic growth both occur as projected, but that 
the age structure of the population (the shares of population of each age) remains at 
current levels. If there were no ageing, expenditure is projected to reach $169 billion 
in 2044–45, whereas with  expected demographic change it is projected to be 25 per 
cent higher at $211 billion. Relative to GDP, ageing also increases expenditure just 
over 25 per cent (8.1 per cent of GDP without ageing compared with 10.3 per cent 
with ageing). However, this is more significant than it first appears. Ageing contributes 
around 2.2 percentage points (or one-half ) of the 4.5 percentage points increase in 
government health expenditure as a proportion of GDP’.20
It is important to emphasise the point that the Productivity Commission was making. ‘When 
expressed as a share of GDP, fiscal pressure can be overwhelmingly attributed to ageing’. This is 
because of the way population ageing slows the growth rate of the economy while increasing real 
health spending faster than growth in GDP per capita. The relative burden on future taxpayers 
will therefore rise.21
The ‘ageing effect’ (Figure 1) is therefore far more significant as a source of fiscal pressure than 
appears from the one-quarter increase in expenditure. When future economic growth and health 
spending was assessed with ageing and without ageing and the effect expressed as a proportion of 
GDP, ageing actually accounted for one half of the additional GDP spent on health.22 By comparison, 
IGR1 and IGR2 analyse only total real expenditure rather than real expenditure per capita as the 
Productivity Commission did.23 On this basis, the Commission reached an unequivocal conclusion 
about the relationship between health and ageing: ‘The clear message that emerges is that, whatever 
measure is used, ageing is likely to have a significant impact on health expenditure’.24
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Figure 1: Projected goernment health expenditure with and without ageing, 2002–03 to 2044–45
Source: Productiity Commission, Economic Implications of an Ageing Australia, 173.
Will ‘healthy ageing’ lower health costs?
The consensus among many health economists, however, is that ‘an ageing population will not 
incur significant health costs’, and will have only a minor effect on health expenditure, because 
older people make big demands on the health system only in their final years of life. In other 
words, people will stay fit and healthy for longer and will then consume the same amount of 
healthcare at the end of their lives as they do at the moment.
The Productivity Commission report disputed this claim. It found ‘no evidence that the rising 
age-cost profile is generated solely by costs at the end of life’. To the contrary, it found that the 
‘limited data available in Australia … support the view that costs rise with age rather than arising 
predominantly at the end of life’.25
What the evidence showed was that health expenditure per person is significantly higher for 
older than for younger people because the incidence of sickness and disability rises with age, and so 
does demand for healthcare in all developed countries. The ongoing cost of providing healthcare 
to elderly people who are not close to death accounts for the bulk of the health spending on the 
elderly. If, as is likely, this continues to be the case, the ‘strong age-related spending patterns’ 
combined with ‘rapidly increasing numbers of older people’ led the Commission to conclude 
‘that, all things being equal, ageing will increase health expenditure significantly’.26 
The Productivity Commission emphasised that while non-demographic rather than 
demographic factors had been the main source of growth in real health expenditure over the last 
twenty years, this pattern will change in the future as the rate of ageing begins to accelerate. The 
sheer number of elderly people will have a big impact on healthcare expenditure by increasing 
the volume of demand and the proportionate cost of providing healthcare to the elderly. ‘Health 
costs will inevitably rise’, the Productivity Commission asserted, because although older people 
may live longer and live healthy lives, ‘in many cases better health is a result of ongoing (and 
costly) treatment’.27
Will prevention lower health costs?
The Commission also considered another argument that health economists and health industry 
representatives have used to minimise the cost ramifications of ageing, which is that new diagnostic 
methods, procedures, and medicines will prevent costly episodes of ill health. Because the larger 
number of elderly will be healthier in the future—assuming that the benefits of new medicine 
result in a decline in the prevalence of chronic conditions and acute episodes—the argument goes 
that health costs will not significantly increase, as there will be offsetting expenditure savings across 
the whole health sector, such as reduced hospital admissions.28
There are good reasons to think that the arguments of the self-proclaimed ‘ageing realists’ are 
overly optimistic. The recent worldwide trend has seen shifts away from medical services to more 
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complex and costly medical goods: more advanced equipment, procedures, and pharmaceutical 
medicines. In Australia, this trend has contributed to health expenditure growing faster than the 
rest of the economy over the last decade or so, and has encompassed a doubling in the cost to 
the Federal government of the PBS, with an important driver of cost growth being new and very 
expensive so-called ‘blockbuster’ drugs, such as Celebrex for treating arthritis.29
The Productivity Commission found that the ‘weight of evidence appears to support the view 
that better health among older people is not going to reduce health expenditure’.30 The evidence 
indicated that at present demand pressures associated with new technology ‘are acting to slightly 
increase—or at least maintain—the current age profile of expenditure across different components 
of health care’. And there are good grounds to believe that ‘the rising share of older people in the 
future will compound the underlying growth in health expenditure arising from demand and 
technology’.31 In a wealthy country, the growing proportion of the population aged over 65 will 
have rather more political muscle, will expect governments to satisfy their expanding healthcare 
needs and wants, and will expect the public system to provide them with the health benefits offered 
by the latest medical technologies, almost as soon as they are available in the private system.
This was the most critical aspect of the Productivity Commission’s 
report: the idea that ageing will have only a minor impact on rising health 
expenditure is open to question, it found, because it is more reasonable 
to expect that ‘in combination with demand and technology, ageing will 
place significant additional pressure on future health expenditure’.32 The 
Commission reasoned that the demand for healthcare in older age groups 
could grow into the middle of the century at considerably higher rates than 
in the past. As the population ages, there will be larger numbers of elderly 
people who will consume more high-cost healthcare, because they will 
demand more and more high tech procedures (such as pacemakers, cochlear 
implants and hip replacements). The rising prevalence of obesity, the resultant 
increase in the disease burden, and the expected continual decline in health 
status according to age, will mean that the elderly will demand more and 
more costly ongoing care and recurring treatment, particularly to manage 
lifestyle-related chronic conditions. Reduced disability and improved quality 
and quantity of life for the elderly due to the better healthcare available 
will therefore not mean lower health costs, but will amplify demand for 
new, sophisticated, and expensive treatments, and mean that ageing will 
exacerbate the pressure associated with new technology.33
Why ageing combined with new technology will significantly increase 
health costs
In a follow-up report in 2005, which examined the past and future impacts of medical technology 
on health expenditure, the Productivity Commission found further evidence that in the future 
ageing and new technology will prove a ‘potent mix’ as a key driver of health expenditure. The 
report confirmed that while there may be some offsetting savings—such as lower aged-care costs, if, 
say, a treatment for Alzheimer’s emerges—new technology would be unlikely to reduce costs across 
the whole sector because anticipated savings are often outweighed by the high cost of new drugs 
and expensive procedures.34 Nor will costs simply be offset by substituting old for new treatments, 
because new treatments often complement rather replace existing ones. Medical innovations also 
tend to increase applications and utilisations. Innovations (such as advances in diagnostic imaging 
technologies) tend to increase the number of diagnoses and to generate new ranges of medicines 
and procedures to treat previously untreatable diseases.35 And not only does new technology 
increase volumes by expanding the age-range of people who can undergo operations; it can also 
lead to greater ongoing volumes and costs associated with treating the chronic conditions of people 
who, as a result of treatment, live longer.36
The Productivity Commission found that the revolutionary advances in medical technology 
that are on the horizon—nano-technology, nano-medicine, genetic testing, gene therapy, 
pharmacogenomics, rational drug design, xenotransplants and bioengineered organ, joint, or 
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tissue replacement, minimally-invasive surgery, robotics and virtual surgery—are likely to prove 
both blessing and curse. Balancing out the enormous health benefits will be the expenditure 
effects of medical advances that make it possible ‘to do more for each patient and intervene with 
more patients’.
What the Productivity Commission highlighted were the heralded advances in medical 
technology which are likely to have a significant clinical application in the near- to medium-
term, and which are therefore likely to create significant expenditure pressures. (Figure 2.)
Figure 2: Medical Adances—What does the future hold?
 Source: Productiity Commission, Impacts of Advances in Medical Technology in Australia, Research
Report, (Melbourne: Commonwealth of Australia, 2005), L.
Ageing, through its role in determining the future disease burden, is fundamental to this. Of 
the new technologies already appearing in the marketplace—such as robotic surgery for prostate 
and heart surgery—and the new compounds in the pipeline expected to become mainstream high-
cost treatments, the Commission found what was to be expected. Medical research and investment 
has focused on areas with the greatest potential growth in demand. Many of the medicines already 
in development are the result of R&D specifically undertaken to discover treatments for the major 
chronic diseases associated with ageing and poor lifestyle, which will impose the greatest disease 
burdens in Western countries as the population ages: cancer, heart disease, diabetes 2, kidney 
disease, blindness, dementia, and arthritis.37 (Figure 3.)
Figure 3: Pharmaceuticals in the international ‘pipeline’, by condition, Noember 2004
Source: Productiity Commission, Impacts of Advances in Medical Technology, 274.
Rather than rely on uncertain modelling assumptions and projections, the Productivity 
Commission provided a reasoned, evidence-based interpretation of why population ageing will 
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amplify the medical revolution’s inflationary effect on health costs. In line with an emerging academic 
consensus about the impact of ageing,38 the Commission’s research confirmed the reasons why we 
cannot afford to be complacent about ageing, given the capacity for new technology to intensify the 
demand-side expenditure pressure on the health system, predominantly in older age groups.39
However, as IGR240 and the response to its release demonstrates, the full implications of the 
Productivity Commission’s warning about the ‘potent cocktail’ of ageing and the medical revolution 
have yet to be incorporated into the debate about health and ageing.41
Will economic growth solve the problem?
Some commentators remain unconvinced. Earlier this year, Ross Gittins saw little reason to be as 
worried about the projected fiscal gap as the Treasurer maintained we should be. Like other self-
styled ‘ageing sceptics’, he argued that the problems posed by ageing are slight, given the expected 
growth in national income.42
Gittins pointed out that the IGRs assume that living standards will be almost twice as high in 
40 years time as now. Only a small part of this increase in national income would have to be used to 
pay for the increased cost of healthcare, so future generations will easily be able to afford additional 
health expenditure. The argument is that to provide for the needs of an ageing population, taxes 
would have to rise only gradually (but not onerously) at the same rate as has occurred over the 
last 40 years.43 In short, ‘our children and grandchildren have little to worry about’. What is 
intergenerationally unfair about paying moderately higher taxes so that the entire population can 
receive ‘better health care’?44
Gittins stressed that higher health spending through general 
taxation was no cause for alarm. His surmise was that ‘as we get richer 
over the years’ we have always wanted and will always want to devote 
a higher proportion of national income to spending on a ‘superior 
good’ like health because increasingly wealthy communities expect 
and demand better quality and quantity of care.45
Against this, the ‘Treasury view’ is that we cannot be sanguine 
about population ageing when this is inevitably bound to impose 
exaggerated tax burdens on future generations.46 Why will future 
generations be willing to accept higher taxes, asked the Secretary to 
the Treasury, Ken Henry in 2004, when ‘our children will experience 
a slower rate of GDP per capita growth than we have enjoyed, yet our 
generation has shown considerable resistance to increasing tax burdens? Why should our children be 
any different?’47 ‘If we are not careful, there is a potential for conflict between generations’, warned 
the then Governor of the Reserve Bank, Ian Macfarlane, in 2003. ‘The young may resent the tax 
burden imposed on them to pay for pension and health spending on the old’, particularly ‘if they 
see the old as owning most the community’s assets’—a reference to the housing boom which has 
enriched baby-boomers while increasing the barriers to home ownership for young generations.48
The ‘Treasury view’ also questions whether the ‘tax and spend’ solution is realistic in the context 
of the globalised economy and a fluid international labor market. Higher future tax rates will have 
real implications for national competitiveness. Australia will be competing with neighbouring Asian 
countries that do not face the same demographic and fiscal challenges, and against other countries—
particularly the United States—to retain and attract skilled workers.49 If policy action is taken today 
to prevent substantial future tax increases tomorrow, Australia could gain a considerable advantage 
over other OECD countries condemned by their demography to endure higher taxes, lower economic 
growth, and the expenditure burdens that previous governments lacked the courage to tackle.50
Treasury Secretary Henry, Treasurer Costello, and Governor Macfarlane have all highlighted 
policies which encourage higher economic growth as the best way of avoiding either higher taxes 
or slashing public spending. All have called for a renewed round of economic reform to increase 
productivity and participation as the least painful way of offsetting the effects of ageing.51 But 
given the potent cocktail of ageing and new technology, it is imprudent to believe that by boosting 
economic growth we will be able to afford the increased cost of Medicare.52
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Why the IGRs can’t say what they should say
‘The forces that have driven up health costs over the long haul are, if anything, 
intensifying. The staggering fecundity of biomedical research is increasing, not 
diminishing. Rapid scientific advance always raises expenditure, even as it lowers 
prices’. —Henry Aaron, ‘The Unsurprising Surprise Of Renewed Health Care 
Cost Inflation,’ Health Affairs, ‘Cost Containment: Commentary Web Exclusive’, 
23 January 2002: http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w2.85v1/
DC1
‘… the overriding pressures on future costs will be due to the demand side of the 
health care market. Undoubtedly, supply factors also play a role … But the major 
drivers of increased future costs are very likely to be the ability of medical care to 
improve health, coupled with rising consumer expectations that these treatments 
should be made available’. —Thomas Rice, ‘Addressing cost pressures in health care 
systems’, Productivity Commission, Health Roundtable, Conference Proceedings, 
(Canberra: AusInfo, 2002), 68–69.
‘Medical technology developments occur in response to 
anticipated demand, which in turn largely reflects the projected 
disease burden. The anticipated accelerated ageing of the 
population is expected to be the major driver of the projected 
disease burden over the next few decades. Thus technological 
advances affecting diseases of ageing could be expected to have 
the greatest impact on healthcare expenditure in Australia in 
the next five to ten years’. —Productivity Commission, Impacts 
of Advances in Medical Technology, 276.
In the lead-up to the release of IGR2, there was some anticipation 
that the ‘surging cost of medical technology and rising demand 
from the ageing population [would] be a centrepiece of the second 
intergenerational report’.53 The expectation was that IGR2 would pick 
up the themes of the 2005 Productivity Commission report on the impact of medical technology.
But IGR2 did not even mention the work of the Productivity Commission on the potential 
growth in health costs due to ageing and the medical revolution. The explanation for this is probably 
political. The Productivity Commission reports show that ageing is a policy problem because the 
elderly are going to increase demand for better healthcare in the future. The implication is that 
demand-side reforms (sometimes called demand-side conservatism) are the appropriate policy 
response—for instance, using more price signals such as user charges or some other form of self-
financing to limit government expenditure. But to canvass such policy alternatives is to challenge the 
bipartisan commitment to the ‘free and universal’ principles of the Medicare system. The politics of 
Medicare—a determination to avoid political backlash and not to set the political hares running by 
casting even the slightest of electorally-damaging shadows over the future of Medicare—probably 
explain why the Intergenerational Reports present the challenges ahead as predominantly supply-
side issues and downplay ageing.54
While the Treasurer has insisted that the intergenerational effects of ageing need to be on the 
national agenda, the Federal government has conspicuously refused to use the Intergenerational 
Reports to set that agenda in health. Instead, IGR2 reiterates the relatively reassuring message that 
the government’s marginal supply-side reforms—higher PBS co-payments and changes to generic 
drug pricing—are controlling the growth in costs, improving the ‘sustainability’ of Medicare, and 
even creating the ‘headroom’ needed to allow new drugs to be listed on the PBS.55 In addition, 
by continuing to endorse in the IGRs the idea that ageing will increase spending by ‘only’ one 
quarter—without providing the qualifications that are readily to hand—the government has let 
the critics of the IGRs enjoy an almost uncontested victory in the debate about the significance 
of ageing.
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What the IGRs should say is that:
•   the projected one-quarter increase in health expenditure due to ageing is only a conservative 
estimate;
•   the effect of ageing, measured by growth in GDP devoted to health spending, is double this;
•   the elderly are going to consume over half of what governments spend on health in the 
future; and
•   the interaction between ageing, technology, and cultural factors has the potential to ratchet 
up ageing-driven health spending.
What IGR1 said about the relationship between health and ageing, IGR2 should have expanded 
by incorporating the measures and scenarios canvassed by the Productivity Commission. 
The 2007 Report would thereby have laid out the reasons why ageing is a far more significant 
intergenerational issue than projections of the ‘pure’ effect of ageing make it appear. It should have 
explained why the prudent course would be to pursue health reform and create as cost-effective 
and sustainable a health system as possible. What it should have made clear is why we cannot 
afford to be complacent about ageing, the medical revolution, and the future of Medicare.
Why ageing means a crisis for Medicare
‘The available evidence indicates that population ageing will only have a limited 
effect on healthcare costs, and there is no evidence that population ageing will cause 
chaos for our health system. Policy making in Australia would be improved if this 
was more widely acknowledged’.— Michael D Coory, ‘Ageing and Health Care 
Costs in Australia: a case of policy-based evidence?’ Medical Journal of Australia, 
180:11, 2004, 581–583, 583.
 Figure 4: ‘Small and manageable’? Why ageing and new technology will hae a substantial 
effect on expenditure—estimated net expenditure impacts of selected adances in medical 
technology
Source: Productiity Commission, Impacts of Advances in Medical Technology, 307.
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Future Australian governments are being counted on to supply an expanded range of expensive, 
state-of-the-art medical treatments, while maintaining ‘equity’ and therefore only minimal 
restraints on demand, at a much greater—indeed, unknown and potentially limitless—cost to the 
taxpayer. The taxpayers of the future are being counted on to fund at least half of the additional 
percentage of GDP spent on health (and probably much more) to provide superior healthcare to 
a much larger and much older, and very fortunate, generation of elderly people.
The question, however, is whether Australian governments are going to be able to continue to 
provide on a ‘free and universal’ basis the sophisticated care that people, the elderly especially, are 
going to want? Will future generations of taxpayers be prepared to bear the significant health costs 
of the unprecedented ageing phenomenon and accompanying medical revolution, and is it fair to 
expect them to do so?
As governments find that health expenditure is continuing to grow faster than the economy 
and revenue, politicians will increasingly have to resort to tighter expenditure controls to limit 
the cost of a ‘free and universal’ public system. In practice, this will mean more rationing and 
longer waiting lists. Governments might also slow the take-up of new medicine, which will mean 
that a technology gap will open which will deny Australians access to the latest advances. It is not 
feasible, in a globalised economy and with a smaller base of taxpayers, that governments will able 
to derive sufficient funds through the taxation system to sustain the present pay-as-you-go basis 
of financing Medicare. If our current arrangements for healthcare 
financing remain unaltered, an unsustainable and overburdened 
Medicare system is likely to deliver lower-standard care and even 
more strictly rationed technology and treatment, and will probably 
still break down under the strain.
Expecting the public health system to deliver higher volumes 
of advanced treatments will starkly expose the tension between the 
bottomless pit of community demand and expectation, and the 
limitations of government budgets. Medicare enjoys a high level of 
community support because people are reassured by the promise of 
universal entitlement to taxpayer-funded health care when illness 
strikes. But when the prospect of ageing and new medical technology 
are thrown into the governmental equation, it is highly unlikely that 
ensuring ‘free’ healthcare for all Australians is going to come out on 
top of the list of governmental priorities.
Defenders of the status quo maintain that any move to limit the 
social entitlements of the elderly will be intolerable because this will 
break the social contract at the heart of the welfare state. Current social policy settings should not 
change, so the argument runs, because retirees who paid taxes throughout their working life to 
support the elderly should receive the same intergenerational transfers in retirement, lest younger 
generations perpetrate a gross intergenerational injustice on the elderly.56 
What those who make this case ignore is the way population ageing in the twenty-first century 
will itself rewrite the generational social contract. Far from being cheated, as it presently stands, the 
baby-boomers are set to expect future generations of taxpayers to pay for an expanded range, level, 
and quality of life-enhancing and life-prolonging medical treatments that they did not have to pay 
tax to provide for the present generation of elderly. As Governor Macfarlane warned, the emergence 
of a generational wealth divide over the last 15 years has set the stage for real intergenerational 
conflict, if a rising tax burden reduces the ability of Gen X and Gen Y to accumulate wealth.57
The ‘free and universal’ health systems of the twentieth century were created in an age when 
medicine was relatively rudimentary and inexpensive, when the old died relatively young, and 
when doctors mainly saved people from misadventure rather than from the consequences of their 
lifestyle choices. It is intergenerationally unfair to insist that younger taxpayers preserve in aspic, 
to the considerable benefit of ageing baby-boomers, a health system intended to provide cheap, 
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basic healthcare to a far younger and healthier population. This is not going to be the case in an 
ageing Australia, given the medical realities of this new century. Accessing the high-tech care will 
substantially enhance and prolong the lives of the elderly—and save more people from the disease 
consequences of their lifestyle.58 A more hardheaded approach to the intergenerational politics of 
Medicare is required.
Without reform, healthcare in the 2040s is likely to be increasingly about rationing. The 
questions will include whether people who suffer from lifestyle-related diseases should be entitled 
to receive all available health care, or whether resources should be conserved to do more to help 
people suffering non-self inflicted conditions. Ageing and the medical revolution also mean that 
far more people will live beyond 80, when frailty, debilitating illness and demand for greater care 
dramatically increase. Should the elderly patient nearing death receive the same level of treatment 
as the young person expected to live a long time? Given increased calls on government to fund a 
wide range of new treatments and procedures, hard decisions will be called for. Informal practices—
the type of rationing that already occurs in public hospitals—and even formal policies may be 
developed by health authorities to determine the circumstances which justify the withdrawal of 
intensive ‘life-saving’ medical intervention from the very sick very old, in favour of giving younger, 
healthier patients priority of access to scarce beds, theatre slots and other therapies.59
Opting out, before Medicare opts out on us
This bleak prospect (referred to as the ‘draconian solution’ in the ageing literature) is the starting 
point for the new politics of health. The evidence strongly suggests that there are no guarantees 
that in the future Medicare will be able to give everyone for ‘free’ all the life-preserving and life-
enhancing procedures and therapies modern medicine makes available. The choice is to opt out of 
Medicare before Medicare opts out on us—or else the healthcare that people will demand but which 
government will not be able to provide will be the great controversy of the twenty-first century.
The average citizen looks somewhat apprehensively on proposals to reform Medicare, since 
people tend to focus only on what they lose—particularly when it comes to protection against the 
risk of ill health—rather than what they have to gain by a transition out of the old arrangements 
in favour of becoming more self-reliant. But the health implications of ageing demand a rethink as 
to whether it is best for governments to retain command or for individuals to take control of the 
provision of their healthcare. There is good reason to think the already antiquated welfarist politics 
of Medicare are going to become positively archaic in the next 40 years.
Future papers in the CIS ‘Health and Ageing’ series will set out what our best options for a sustainable 
health system may be.
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